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This thesis juxtaposes Plato's allegory of the cave 
with Jacques Derrida's concept of the always already aspect 
of meaning, a concept derived from Ferdinand de Saussure's 
work. This theoretical investigation will allow me to 
examine the implications of universal Signified forms of 
word meanings for postmodern composition theory. The 
discussion includes deep theoretical as well as 
contemporary considerations for a liminal space in which 
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Perspectives vary on how meaning occurs, especially 
when those views are juxtaposed with views on meaning's 
relationship to language. On this question, one of the 
primary oppositions in composition studies concerns the 
infinite or finite approach to meaning-making. That is, 
compositionists tend to perceive meaning in language as 
existing either outside (infinite approach) or inside 
(finite approach) a social context. In many ways, this 
opposition in rhetoric and composition has to do with a 
postmodern field's resistance to Platonic ideals that still 
hold sway in much scholarship.
Historically, Plato describes an individual's 
encounter with Signified forms that somehow inspire recall 
of transcendental meanings and names that appear to be 
innate yet always already a challenge to recall in the 
mind. Signs, often in texts, are endowed with meaning 
although their completeness is in question. More recently, 
postmodernists like Jacques Derrida problematize Platonic 
theory's applicability for modern times. In composition 
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studies, postmodernists typically reject Platonic theories 
of meaning-making (and accept a sort of Derridean theory of 
the same) because they interpret Plato's work as denying 
the act of composing in absolutist and elitist terms. My 
thesis challenges the postmodern view; specifically, I show 
how Platonic theory is applicable to composition studies, 
where writing encompasses the act of meaning-making, the 
compositionist, and the reader when creating an essay in 
the composition classroom.
Perhaps the best example of postmodern composition's 
attempts to deal with Plato is Jasper Neel's Plato, 
Derrida, and Writing. In this work, Neel addresses this 
debate by identifying what is at stake for composition 
studies in two uncertainties: (1) who is privileged to make 
meaning, and (2) what counts as thinking (5). These two 
concerns are the core of the Derrida-Plato conflict in 
composition studies because they underscore the concern in 
the field with those who are denied a contributing voice in 
the "scholarly conversation." Neel provides both an attack 
and defense of Platonic and Derridian theory through a 
sophistic approach. I define sophism as the art of 
persuading in the moment and tailored for a specific 
audience, with disregard for "truth" and Signified 
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universal forms because sophists "are concerned primarily 
with practical rhetoric and skeptical of humanity's ability 
to discover and communicate truth" (Neel 8). Essentially, 
Neel reads Plato and Derrida together in order to exemplify 
a sophistic approach to the question of meaning-making. 
Neel constructs this approach in order to promote 
sophistry's relevance for modern composition studies as 
well as to deemphasize Plato and Derrida's impact. Neel's 
interpretation is both postmodern and sophistic, and 
therefore should be addressed within the liminal space of 
this analysis.
Bluntly put, postmodernists reject Platonic theory 
because it asserts universals, and postmodernism denies 
universal meaning in all forms. In composition studies, a 
largely postmodern field, this rejection of Platonic theory 
serves as an assertion of a particular relationship between 
meaning, language (especially written language), and 
origin. In this thesis, I read Plato's famous cave allegory 
in conjunction with Derridean theory in order to challenge 
this assertion; that is, I read against Neel's 
juxtaposition of Plato and Derrida in order to reconsider 
Platonic theory's applicability to current composition 
studies.
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Specifically, it is my claim that each element of the 
cave allegory represents Plato's preference of meaning­
making in language through universal Signified forms. By 
juxtaposing Plato's allegory of the cave with Derrida's 
postmodern concept of the always already aspect of meaning­
making (a concept derived from Ferdinand de Saussure's 
work), I will examine the implications of universal 
Signified forms of word meanings for postmodern composition 
theory. In this approach, I will likely find relation 
between Plato and Derrida that will allow compositionists 
to recognize the possibility of both universal Signifieds 
as well as the decenteredness of meaning-making in 
language.
Plato's Cave Allegory
Plato's cave allegory is within the ten books of The 
Republic. Prior to using this allegory, Plato explains his 
concepts through a series of allegorical situations within 
his version of the perfect city-state with various social 
groups. However, in Book VII, he changes the setting of the 
allegory to a cave. He shrinks the setting and social 
groups, as if attempting to eliminate as many distractions 
as possible. Prior to the cave allegory, other Republic 
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speakers constantly interrupt Plato's main speaker, 
Socrates, in order to clarify various distracting details 
that are present in the larger setting of the city-state. 
This microcosmic structure, combined with the use of 
allegory, is Plato's attempt to relate a complex theory as 
simply as possible.
The theory? The allegory of the cave presents an image 
of a person's nature in education, including a desire to 
learn and comprehension of things learned. This allegory 
implies, through simple imagery, that a person can recover 
a certain amount of transcendental knowledge despite the 
competing and powerful voices of society. Those competing 
social voices make judgments constantly about physical 
objects and abstract concepts.
According to the generally accepted view by modern 
theorists, including postmodernists, Plato's cave allegory 
shows how the uneducated person is at the mercy of finite 
sense impressions. The uneducated create impressions from 
shadows and echoes, thereby assuming these perceptions are 
the only reality (Bloom, White, and Borrowman 138). Plato 
suggests the uneducated mob creates "false" meaning-making 
by relying on socially constructed meaning instead of 
searching for universal meanings in language. The shadows 
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represent written language for Plato. In the allegory, 
Plato divides the process of "true" meaning-making in 
language, or reality that consists of timeless Signified 
forms, from "false" meaning-making, or reality that relies 
solely on socially constructed meaning in language.
A detailed description of the cave allegory is 
necessary before analyzing the possibility of Platonic and 
postmodern theory both applying to composition studies. 
Basically, the allegory shows one shackled prisoner, 
identified only as a male by Plato, becoming released from 
his bindings at the bottom of a cave. A whole society of 
shackled prisoners resides at the bottom where they make 
meaning out of shadowy images projected on the wall. 
Another society, those overseeing the puppet show that 
projects shadows on the cave wall below, subject the freed 
prisoner to face the incompleteness of what he previously 
knew. The freed prisoner journeys to the world outside the 
cave. He encounters actual objects for the first time, 
instead of imitation shadowy images or puppets. The 
allegory ends with the freed prisoner considering his next 
destination in the journey: reentering the cave to teach 
the shackled prisoner society about the actual objects, or 
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continue learning from other actual objects that can be 
encountered on the surface world outside the cave.
In the beginning of the cave allegory, Plato 
introduces the first group of people dwelling in the lowest 
part of a cave. They are part of a society, albeit an 
imprisoned one. The position of their shackled bodies only 
allows them to see toward the back of the cave. Since 
childhood, they have been in bonds at the bottom of the 
cave with only shadowy images to educate them.
The cave's population relies on images forced onto 
them because of their limited ability to move and see 
anything else. Furthermore, the prisoners only construct 
meaning based on the limited variety of images projected on 
the cave wall. So far, the most visual aspect is a double 
physical imprisonment of those at the bottom of the cave.
The first physical imprisonment, the cave-, denies 
interaction between the world above and the collective 
society of prisoners. The dark, subterranean nature of the 
cave depicts a place of abandonment as well as imprisonment 
because the prisoners appear to be left there' without much 
goodwill by the rest of society. Its darkness conceals all 
peripheral stimuli except for selective sounds and shadowy 
images made by "puppet-handlers," or overseers, that Plato 
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assigns a higher social function within the allegory, to be 
discussed later (The Republic 7.514b). The cave serves to 
inhibit meaning-making at the societal level, with only one 
ascending tunnel behind the prisoners where images and 
sounds travel from, out of sight of those chained.
The second physical imprisonment, the shackles, 
severely restricts individual sensory experiences that 
might build knowledge between prisoners. Plato uses the 
shackles to represent the restraint of meaning-making by 
the individual. Specifically, no permanent records are 
allowed; knowledge must be reconstructed by each generation 
of prisoners through the oral tradition. Also, shackles are 
necessary because they are external conditioners. 
Therefore, the prisoners are not to blame for internal 
weaknesses.
Throughout the allegory, the overseers provide limited 
stimuli for meaning-making by perpetuating a puppet show in 
the form of shadowy images projected on the cave wall. 
During this endless puppet show, shackled prisoners attempt 
to construct knowledge creatively by relying on empirical 
observations on the shadowy images, which are taken as the 
only reality by those prisoners. Here, the prisoners 
attempt a degree of social creativity among themselves in 
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order to codify the shadowy images. The construction of 
meaning seems proportional to relationships the prisoners 
construct between previous visual images seen, speculation 
about what future images will appear, and oral arguments 
about the current images seen. Through collaborative 
relationships, the prisoners are "able to discuss things 
with one another" and believe they are correctly "naming 
these things going by before them that they see" (The 
Republic 7.515b). Hence, two factors allow for authority 
among these prisoners: recall and dialectic. Authority 
includes power in the prisoner society as well as 
authorship of their socially constructed language.
Among the prisoners, competition would be linked with 
meaning-making through oratory skills, which become the 
only aspect of their lives that they can control. In this 
oral tradition, memory recall serves best of all because 
accolades are bestowed on the person:
... who is sharpest at making out the things that 
go by, and most remembers which of them are 
accustomed to pass before, which after, and which 
at the same time as others, and who is thereby 
most able to divine what is going to come. (The 
Republic 7.516c-d)
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The voices of those with the keenest memory dominate the 
ongoing conversation as well as making the meaning that the 
entire society abides by while witnessing the shadowy 
images. The previous passage also illustrates the cyclic 
nature of meaning-making through images shown to the 
prisoners. Like successive generations of oral meaning­
making, the shadowy images repeat themselves. The 
prisoners' socially reliant language always already 
constructs itself by the act of repetition; the prisoners 
repeat their labeling of the images on the cave wall.
The audio-visual images (the projected sounds and 
images from the overseers) reinforce a certain kind of 
memory recall that Plato abhors because the naming and 
predicting of the shadowy images represents opining without 
reference to any universal, and therefore substantial, 
origin. For Plato, people should desire "to undergo 
anything whatsoever rather than to opine those things and 
live that way" (The Republic 7.516d). Plato's preference 
indicates a superiority of searching for' meanings that are 
distinct regardless of social construction. His preference 
acknowledges the positive nature of visual cues, like 
written language or shadowy images, only insofar as those 
cues direct a person to consider meaning-making in itself 
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and apart from social-construction. Plato seems to warn 
against taking society's opinion for the "true" nature of 
meaning.
The prisoners' act of recall becomes a matter of 
remembering shadowy images based on reappearance and 
sequence. The rote act of socially constructed meaning­
making correlates closely with postmodernism's version of 
composition. Postmodernism views nearly all interpretations 
as valid regardless of etymological roots connected with 
origin and authorship. Postmodernism's meaning-making seems 
to depend on the same shadowy set of images without any 
added insight or collection of information to better inform 
perspectives on the images.
A sophistic prisoner reigns in the social group of 
shackled prisoners. This happens because the occasions for 
speaking are equally as hollow as the previous times, 
without additional insight or further discussion. Platonic 
meaning-making opposes the sophistic approach and suggests 
a more justified form of learning beyond the shadowy images 
that serve as reminders. In contrast to Plato's preference 
for meaning-making, prisoners vie for the honor of speaking 
for speaking's sake, with appearance of images being the 
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only context. Likewise, the speakers do not provide insight 
into any connection with universal forms.
For the prisoners, dialectic is the method by which 
people argue to construct knowledge. They see and hear the 
shadowy images pass across the cave wall and begin "to 
compete" among the other "perpetual prisoners in forming 
judgments about those shadows" (The Republic 7.516e). 
Competition for naming (and renaming) of shadowy images 
occurs solely through dialectic. Oral knowledge 
construction of meaning-making is the sole method because 
the prisoners' hands are bound; they cannot write or carve 
a permanent record for themselves and future generations.
However, the prisoners' arguments and judgments about 
the shadowy images help construct names based on the visual 
images. Those prisoners who speak seek to gain authority. 
Likewise, the speaking prisoners learn from each other in 
conjunction with the images seen on the wall as they 
attempt remembrance and judgment on the shadowy images. The 
shadowy images are similar to words on a page that remind a 
reader of socially constructed meaning attached to that 
word-image. Likewise, those who listen also learn from the 
imprisoned orators but only with the aid of the shadowy 
visual cues.
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For instance, the prisoners attempt to codify names by 
connecting sounds with images that occur simultaneously. 
The newly defined names refer "only to those passing 
shadows which they saw" (The Republic 7.515b). An image of 
a dog, shown simultaneously when an overseer coughs, causes 
prisoners to believe the two events collectively represent 
"dogness." Ideals such as "truth," collaboratively 
constructed, remain incomplete and inaccurate because 
"truth is nothing other than the shadows of artificial 
things" that the prisoners perpetually decide on 
arbitrarily (The Republic 7.515c). To this point, the 
presence of pain during the learning process can represent 
the struggle every student undergoes when learning from 
professional educators instead of laypersons. I associate 
professional educators with Plato's overseers. Plato would 
likely describe the overseers as philosopher-teachers 
because he seems to esteem them above others in the social 
world of The Republic.
Here, the importance of a visual cue requires 
elaboration because of its significance to Plato as well as 
to composition studies. He could have described a cave 
allegory without images. The prisoners could have shouted 
in complete darkness without the aid of shadowy images but 
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this would alter the allegory away from a Plato's judgment 
about writing and visual language.
If there is only darkness in the cave, then meaning­
making becomes based on orators who speak knowledge into 
existence by voice alone. Plato cannot write an allegory in 
which the cave is void of visual language because that 
would weaken Plato's stance against writing. He praises 
orators in other texts because the philosophers of his time 
were orators who relied on speeches and memorization 
instead of written cues. The inclusion of visual images 
occurs in stages within Plato's allegory, just as he 
constructs meaning slowly so the reader can digest what is 
being stated. Most importantly for Plato is the distinction 
between naming images by incomplete shadowy information, or 
with Signified forms.
How does Plato distinguish naming visual cues 
incompletely and completely? In the allegory, the shadowy 
images are the projections from puppets moving in front of 
firelight, which casts the shadow against the back of the 
cave for the prisoners to see. The fire and puppets are the 
constructions of overseers. These collaborative 
constructions of meaning-making are misinterpreted by the 
prisoners because the shackles limit prisoners' ability to 
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look behind and recognize the nature of fire, puppets and 
overseers.
The Freed Prisoner
During the allegory, one of the prisoners becomes free 
for unexplained reasons. Once liberated, the overseers 
engage in a series of progressive dialectical exchanges 
with the freed prisoner. This dialectic is different than 
the freed prisoner's prior mimetic experiences. The 
overseers discuss the puppet show's trickery. They explain 
"while now, because he is somewhat nearer to what is and 
more turned toward beings, he sees more correctly" in order 
to lead him toward an understanding of the universal aspect 
of meaning-making (The Republic 7.515d). Through this 
dialectic with the overseers, the freed prisoner must 
consider the shadowy images of puppets as less real than 
the puppets themselves in the construction of language and 
meaning-making. The beginning of the freed prisoner's 
learning process with the overseers causes him to recognize 
the concept of imitation.
For Plato, dialectic in teacher-student relationships 
opens the possibility toward completeness in a Signified 
universal context. However, the freed prisoner does not 
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comprehend universal symbolic forms yet. The puppets are 
symbols of his learning, revealing more information as he 
inspects them clearly by the light of the fire. The 
overseers must still urge the freed prisoner onward toward 
a path of greater learning because this didactic experience 
requires a focus that his socially constructed experience 
opposes because of its foreignness.
The initial learning process brings about a somewhat 
forced mental application. He is "dragged away from there 
by force ... into the light of the sun" that causes 
temporary pain as his vision—the key to understanding 
visual language—acclimates to the open landscape beyond the 
cave (The Republic 7.515e-516a). Part of the pain surely 
comes from the realization of how little he knew prior to 
becoming freed. The imitations, still parading across the 
firelight for those still shackled below, would mock the 
freed prisoner painfully because he would perceive the 
images as false and incomplete. He would face the puppet 
show and remember how devoutly he once believed in social 
construction of the images, and this would likely lead to a 
self-image that is as false and incomplete as opined, 
socially constructed language.
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The first stage of greater understanding for Plato 
concerns the painful acknowledgment of previous concepts as 
incomplete imitations. Within this discovery, Plato infers 
one of the dangers of empirical meaning-making by asserting 
the prisoners collaborate to create improper connections 
between pieces of information. These improper connections 
indicate a body of knowledge that is painfully worse than 
incomplete — it is inaccurate.
Plato does not explain in the allegory why this 
particular prisoner is freed. Is the shackling random or 
selection-based? Not everyone would be able to cope with 
the pain of this educational process. It seems likely that 
the unshackling is not random but selection-based because 
not everyone would be able to cope with this education 
process since it does involve a degree of pain. The freed 
prisoner suffers realization of how little he and the other 
prisoners know when the overseers force him to confront the 
puppets. Plato insinuates that greater suffering leads to 
greater comprehension of names and knowledge, as the freed 
prisoner journeys the rest of the way out of the cave and 
into direct sunlight.
In the outside world, the overseers no longer use 
force to teach the freed prisoner. Realization of the 
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imitations in the cave causes the freed prisoners to desire 
the real forms. Similarly, a growing child hungers for more 
substantial food instead of subsisting only on milk. 
Instead of the imitations seen on the cave wall or the 
puppets that cause the imitations, the outside world 
contains "the things themselves" (The Republic 7.516a). 
Gazing at genuine forms—those visual symbols of the outside 
world—is a direct act motivated by the freed prisoner 
without coercion from the overseers. Desire to learn 
genuine, not imitation knowledge becomes the primary method 
of meaning-making but this final step would not be possible 
without the socially constructed actions by the society of 
overseers, or teachers of the ignorant slave populace.
The freed prisoner learns over time to make inferences 
based on those original artifacts. The ability to infer 
comes, in part, from the freed prisoner's use of innate 
knowledge and does not depend upon educators like the 
overseers because:
... this power is in the soul of each, and that 
the instrument with which each learns ... must be 
turned around from that which is coming into 
being together with the whole soul until it is 
able to endure looking at that which is and. the 
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brightest part of that which is." (The Republic
7.518c)
Plato uses the unshackled person's revelation of the 
genuine objects, contrasted with projected imitations in 
the cave, to explain the existence of certain knowledge as 
innate and predating any socially constructed meaning­
making. The revelation is a new awareness of innate 
knowledge.
The authentic objects serve as catalysts for the 
remembrance of inherent knowledge. The shadowy images 
correlate with the puppets, which correlate with the 
authentic forms seen in the world beyond the cave. Here, 
Plato suggests a mental bridge develops for the freed 
prisoner between what always already is and what becomes 
prescribed over time, especially through visual images.
The mental bridge enacts a play of knowledge learning 
between innate and socially sanctioned language. This 
bridge occurs between the intelligible (always already 
universal forms) and the solely visible (images, 
projections, and reflections). Furthermore, Plato situates 
this playful distinction of learning through argument. He 
uses a select group of overseers as knowledge builders. 
These overseers help build the bridge using dialectic; they 
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bring forth connections between the freed prisoner and 
innate knowledge. Further into the freed prisoner's 
learning journey, Plato employs a play of knowledge through 
an internal debate with himself.
The freed prisoner's education and freedom occur 
because of a select group of overseers. They represent good 
intentioned educators, as opposed to bad overseers whom 
Plato likens to sophists and animal keepers of the image- 
fixated general public (The Republic 6.493a-494a). The 
sophistic group of overseers, who are "wage earners" as 
educators of the shackled cave prisoners "in nothing other 
than these convictions of the many, which they opine when 
they are gathered together, and he calls this wisdom" (The 
Republic 6.493a).
In the book immediately preceding the cave allegory, 
Plato delineates good versus bad educators. A division 
between sophistic overseers and those intending goodwill 
through dialectic establishes the complicated roles present 
in the cave allegory. Hence, the cave allegory represents 
the culmination of concepts expressed in the previous books 
of The Republic, especially Book 6.
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Plato's Allegory through Derrida
Like a machine that functions off a series of gears, 
the cave allegory operates off the preceding books of The 
Republic. Allegory itself plays with the complex language 
preceding it in an uncomplicated manner in order to be more 
approachable to those attempting to understand Plato's 
concepts. Allegory becomes Plato's bridge to the readers of 
The Republic. Consequently, allegory itself becomes a 
useful connection between Plato and Derrida because the 
playful use of language is necessary for an allegory to 
clearly express the intended meaning.
Derrida's sense of "freeplay," much like a car 
steering wheel's loose, vacillating movement, works in 
connection with the language used to create and construct 
an allegory. For Derrida, language works within freeplay, 
which is "a field of infinite substitutions" that is 
"permitted by the lack ... of a center" (Writing and 
Difference 289). It seems all language might be 
allegorical, if Derrida's view is correct. Infinite 
freeplay in meaning-making corresponds to Derrida's concept 
of the always already aspect of meaning. This concept 
derives from Ferdinand de Saussure's work, especially 
Course in General Linguistics.
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Saussure, whose semiotic theory forms the basis of 
much postmodern theory, argues that language is a system of 
binaries called Signs that contain both the material world 
expression (the Signifier) and the concept to which it 
refers (the Signified). While the Signified remains the 
same over time despite name changes, the Signifier is the 
written or spoken expression that is susceptible to 
generational change (Bressler 81). Hence, the Sign itself 
remains intact over time even if the name applied to that 
Sign (the Signifier) shifts. Figure 1, by Saussure, depicts 
the Sign as represented by Signified forms on the left and 





Figure 1. From Ferdinand de Saussure.
(Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally, Albert 
Sechehaye, and Albert Reidlinger. Trans. Wade Baskin. New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 65.)
In postmodernist terms, the Sign and its system of 
relations predetermine any meaning that can be made from 
its use. It is in this sense that universal Signified forms 
of word meanings and names within the cave allegory connect 
with postmodern composition theory. For Derrida and other 
postmodern theorists, the writer is forever attempting to 
reclaim meaning that is always already fading from an 
unredeemable transcendental Signified. Here, always already 
is significant as a liminal space that can link certain 
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aspects of Platonic theory present in the cave allegory to 
postmodern views of composition theory.
To return to the freed prisoner with Derrida's concept 
of freeplay in mind, one key question requires pursuit: 
can/does the freed prisoner attain complete knowledge, 
completing the journey of remembrance and comprehension? In 
Dissemination, Derrida characterizes "always already" as a 
vehicle of memory that already possesses outside knowledge 
itself, "always therefore already needs [S]igns in order to 
recall the non-present, with which it is necessarily in 
relation" (109). This statement evokes Plato's 
consideration of discourse as a perpetual journey to reach 
universal forms of meaning and not an attainable 
destination since:
... that which argument itself grasp with the 
power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not 
beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, 
steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach 
what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of 
the whole. (The Republic 6.511b)
The freed prisoner progresses in education only to reach 
the beginning of that journey in an always already circle 
of re-remembrance wherein:
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... argument now depends on that which depends on 
this beginning and in such fashion goes back down 
again to an end; making no use of anything sensed 
in any way, but using forms themselves, going 
through forms to forms, it ends in forms too" in 
a transcendental yet endless circle. (The 
Republic 6.511b-c)
The process of learning through forms — through symbolic 
yet transcendental forms—allows the freed prisoner to 
accomplish two complicated operations related to 
composition. First, he can read a language of meaning that 
always already makes itself appear for further 
interpretation within a body of symbols (of a composed 
language). Second, he can mentally write that language in a 
unique yet form-inspired pattern. Plato's claim that words 
exist in order to name ideas and not things seems like a 
theoretical precursor of postmodern ideas of language and 
meaning.
Innate Objective Forms Debate
Plato proposes a circular pattern of meaning-making 
within a dialogic in which argument becomes dependent on 
nuanced repetition from the beginning to end and back again 
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(The Republic 6.511b-c). Yet, within the cave allegory, the 
freed prisoner seems to attain the highest level of 
intelligibility. This attainment transpires with 
transcendental forms when he is at last able to look 
directly at the sun, which epitomizes the source of time, a 
"steward of all things in the visible place, and is in a 
certain way the cause of all those things he and his 
companions had been seeing" (The Republic 7.516b-c).
How does Platonic logic progress beyond this 
absolutist statement, especially when he posits, "What 
then?" and considers the ramifications of the enlightened 
freed prisoner returning to the bottom of the cave out of 
pity for the remaining mob's sophistic unintelligibility? 
Is it reconcilable with the previous statement of an 
endless circle of meaning-making through dialectic? 
Likewise, how does Derrida's view of innateness and 
objective forms engage this complication?
Because meaning-endowed Signified forms are never 
fully complete within the meaning-making paradigm, 
Derridian flexibility, or nonlinear representation, can be 
compared to the Platonic absoluteness of language and 
meaning-making. What is the Derridian flexibility? Derrida 
cites an event that occurs in the structure of any meaning­
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making, defined as a "rupture and a redoubling" that leads 
to a center or a gravitational endpoint that "does not 
belong to the totality" because "the totality has its 
center elsewhere" (Writing and Difference 278). Certain 
lesser dramatic events typically occur prior to the 
dramatic rupture within this Derridian concept, like 
tremors occur before a great earthquake to decentralize 
stability.
To return to Plato: before gazing directly at the sun 
and recognizing innate knowledge through inference, the 
freed prisoner improves his understanding of meaning-making 
through dialectic. Initially, this improvement occurs with 
other prisoners. Inevitably, the dialectic continues for 
him with overseers. This scaffolding of meaning-making 
causes pain and the substitution of previously held 
opinions that Derrida would classify as a "series of 
substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of 
determinations of the center" (Writing and Difference 279).
Specifically, every time the freed prisoner learns 
more, the new meanings decentralize his understanding as 
well as the infinite connections that can be inferred from 
each understanding. These movements "are always taken from 
a history of meaning ... whose origin may always be 
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reawakened or whose end may always be anticipated in the 
form of presence" (Writing and Difference 279). The new 
meanings could represent variations of Signifiers toward an 
innate yet mobile Signified origin. The mobile shift of the 
Signified for any named Sign translates to a pliable 
structure. The pliability is the process of expanded 
meaning as it occurs in the freed prisoner's archaeology.
At the moment of the freed prisoner's seemingly full 
development of Signifieds (upon gazing directly at the 
sun), the fullness of that development ruptures. This 
happens because it "has always already been exiled from 
itself into its own substitute" (Writing and Difference 
280). By looking directly at the sun, the freed prisoner 
completes a mental composition of meaning-making. All the 
symbols previously studied, from the shadowy images to the 
sun itself, stack together like an essay. The body of the 
paper is complete and the conclusion paragraph seems to 
finish.
However, the essential nature of the conclusion is to 
destabilize an ending and to return to the introduction 
paragraph, to always already begin anew before the last 
period silences the composition absolutely. Likewise, the 
freed prisoner's thoughts have always already turned toward 
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another beginning after gazing at the seemingly 
completeness of the sun. The inherent desire for 
intelligibility always already leads toward a new center. 
In turn, this intelligibility leans toward reciprocating 
with society to improve their wellbeing. The Signifieds 
always already become unstable without a composition to 
express them in nuanced discourses of Signifiers, of names 
and shadowy images.
The freed prisoner seeks a new center, an audience for 
his composition. Plato's freed prisoner, acting out of 
desire and pity, returns back to the bottom of the cave in 
order to express the knowledge of language "which has 
somehow existed before it" (Writing and Difference 280). He 
returns where the shackled prisoners still reside in 
sophistic ignorance in order to relate what he has learned, 
just as some of the overseers did for him (The Republic 
7.516c). Here at the rupture, where admission of 
incompleteness occurs, the social construction of knowledge 
becomes possible for Derrida, the other postmodernists, and 
Plato.
Derridian flexibility becomes possible in Platonic 
allegory. Through Derrida's explanation, the innateness of 
knowledge categorizes:
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... a system in which the central [S]ignified, 
the original or transcendental [S]ignified, is 
never absolutely present outside a system of 
differences. The absence of the transcendental 
[S]ignified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely. (Writing and Difference 
280)
Like conjoined twins who share an essential organ but are 
unique from the other, Derrida and Plato share innateness 
through this flexibility of rupture. The rupture seems 
innate within the always already uncenteredness of the 
Signifier-Signified relationship in language.
As a social being, the freed prisoner desires to 
compose, to share, with others what he has learned because 
of the inherent nature of the human experience that "has 
always already begun to proclaim itself and begun to work" 
(Writing and Difference 280). Transcendental Signified 
forms are never an endpoint in meaning-making for Plato or 
Derrida, just as the language learning process is never 
wholly centralized within a single individual. Likewise, 
social construction is not the whole of language learning 
because a degree of subjective individuality is what always 
already decentralizes the objective language of Signifiers.
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Here, freeplay sustains the objective language and the 
subjective language learner in play within a Sign-laden 
environment, in texts and in the social world.
For freeplay to always already exist in language, it 
enacts the compound process of deferring and differing from 
any centeredness or final presence. This deferring and 
differing process is what Derrida would label collectively 
as "differance" (Writing and Difference 293, Dissemination 
168). Derrida selects differance because this French word 
means to defer as well as to differ. This precise word 
choice allows Derrida to play with his own language and 
remain purposefully imprecise. He creates a pun within his 
theory through differance, decentering a singular meaning 
to his language.
Despite the aforementioned correlations between 
Derrida and Plato, Derrida contends Platonic theory opposes 
his perception of composition regarding the democratic 
nature of meaning-making. For Derrida, "[d]emocracy is 
orgy, debauchery, flea market, fair, 'a bazaar ... of 
constitutions where one can choose the one to make one's 
own'" (Dissemination 145). Plato regards the democratic 
arrangement, those where meaning is regulated by the many, 
as the second-worst type for a society.
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Therefore, one of Derrida's primary criticisms of 
Plato's negative depiction of writing as "[u]proofed, 
anonymous, unattached to any house or country, this almost 
insignificant signifier is at everyone's disposal" and 
therefore democratically attuned (Dissemination 144). 
Writing is connected to the nature of writing as an always 
already visual tool that the masses can pick up and read 
for themselves without a schooled orator's interpretation. 
Derrida posits the masses gain the ability to find 
Signifieds through writing because it is available for all 
to both read and write as well as to digest and construct.
Plato illustrates the cave allegory's shackled 
prisoners in a bazaar-like state where they behave 
chaotically, shouting contrived names for shadowy images in 
a competitive atmosphere. Meaning-making is without 
philosophic or schooled expertise to guide the prisoners 
(The Republic 8.544e). This allegory forms one of Plato's 
critiques of writing, namely, that non-philosophical, non­
schooled writers are like deceptive sophists, who rely on 
assumptions of "probability" rather than "truth."
The sophists are the shouting unschooled prisoners at 
the bottom of the cave. They attempt to persuade themselves 
and the shackled masses by a version of dialectic that 
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lacks Signified-based truth (Phaedrus 164). Just as the 
shackled prisoners rely on shadowy, incomplete 
representations of objects, so also the meaning they make 
relies on an unjust imitation of what only seems to be the 
truth (Phaedrus 156). The naming process by the unschooled 
shackled prisoners becomes a corrupted approximation of 
Signified-endowed objects.
The meaning made by the masses becomes incorrect and 
immoral through Plato's interpretation of the shackled 
prisoners as engaging in sophistry that imitates the truth 
but without a Signified form. (Likewise, Plato's Phaedrus 
represents Derrida's target because of the distinction 
between bad and good writing, segregated by the relative 
absence or presence of meaning made through opinions by 
uneducated masses.) The shackled prisoners possess an 
uneducated agency to construct meaning without the approval 
or screening of professionally trained writers/orators to 
enlighten the masses in a regulated format. For Plato and 
Derrida, the nature of the shackled prisoners is both 
democratic and sophistic.
Plato disdains the democratic nature of the prisoners, 
and the sophistic way they opine with each other. Derrida 
ridicules Plato's sophistic writing style because the Greek 
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scholar clearly writes, throughout The Republic and other 
texts, about the dangers of sophism as false wisdom 
(opinion). Plato presents the shackled prisoners as 
sophists who transform the shadowy images into what Derrida 
would label "simulacr[a]," or copies of shadowy copies that 
are void of Signified origins and "'mime absolute 
knowledge'" (Dissemination 108,138). For Plato, meaning­
making from a copy of a copy is the farthest point away 
from authentic knowledge and truth itself.
Derrida clarifies Plato's condemnation of writing as 
an act of differance. This decentered writing possesses 
shadowy images-as-simulacra that are a kind of textual Sign 
that "has no essence or value of its own, whether positive 
or negative. It plays within the simulacrum. It is in its 
type the mime of memory, of knowledge, of truth, etc" 
(Dissemination 105-106). The democratic mob, shackled and 
shouting at the bottom of the cave, appropriates the chance 
of meaning-making to every common person without regard to 
the true Signified forms to the images named.
Derrida insists Plato intends meaning-making to be an 
internal and universal experience within the individual 
because:
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.. the conclusion of the Phaedrus is less a
condemnation of writing in the name of present 
speech than a preference for one sort of writing 
over another ... for a seed that engenders 
because it is planted inside over a seed 
scattered wastefully outside: at the risk of 
dissemination" by nonprofessionals.
(Dissemination 149)
Since this type of meaning-making lacks the filtering 
approval of a professional educator, the meaning is 
artificial and sophistic. The meaning appeals to the 
audience based on probability of acceptance rather than on 
Signified substantiation.
The Signified forms remain absent because the shackled 
mob does not possess a traditional education that 
epitomizes the freed prisoner. Initially, overseers educate 
the freed prisoner in a traditional sense. Thereafter, the 
freed prisoner improves the foundation of that traditional 
education through self-actualized introspection of innate 
knowledge. In this bazaar model, meaning becomes made in a 
format relative to mere shadowy images without connection 
to Signified forms or professionally educated overseers.
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Conclusion
For Neel, sophistry embodies a pliable, liminal space 
where compositionists might position their perspectives 
between Plato and Derrida by remaining purely rhetoricians. 
Here, Neel's rhetorician-writer must deny the Platonic view 
of idealistic universals such as closure and truth, as well 
as the Derridian view of philosophically-oriented 
composition studies (Plato, Derrida, and Writing 203-204). 
Unfortunately, Neel cripples the neutrality of his analysis 
early in the text by admitting to a preference for 
Derridian-style deconstruction and postmodernism (xii). In 
this way, Neel steers his sophistic reasoning away from 
liminal objectivity. Perhaps this is Neel's attempt to 
admit a natural human subjectivity. Regardless, his stance 
should have been written in a way that sustains an 
impartial authorial presence.
As it is currently written, Neel's strong authorial 
presence from the beginning of the text invalidates his 
promotion of sophist-centric rhetoric for composition 
studies. He deconstructs himself. Furthermore, Neel's 
sophistic close reading of Plato's Phaedrus and Derrida's 
Dissemination does not inaugurate a new movement in future 
composition studies, as he purports to do at the 
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beginning(x). Instead, Neel attempts to erase the Platonic 
and Derridian past simultaneously through sophistic and 
Derridian tools.
This text answers what Neel does not desire for 
compositionists more than it answers what he does desire, 
just as Derrida describes differance by consistently 
"explaining what it is not" and denying the existence of an 
origin (Plato, Derrida, and Writing 157,200). Neel also 
employs close reading to suggest Plato and Derrida are both 
relevant today because they comprise symbiotic yet 
cannibalistic theories. These two theories are always 
already enablers of writing and rhetoric for composition 
studies wherein Plato settles "for nothing less than truth, 
cancels Derrida, who in turn cancels Plato by writing so as 
to show the impossibility of other writers" (204) . Attempts 
by critics such as Neel reveal the complexity of attempting 
separate criticism of Plato and Derrida within a liminal 
space.
My overview of The Republic and its allegory of the 
cave serves to ground this thesis historically; further, it 
establishes allegory itself as a useful connection between 
Plato and Derrida. Derrida's critique of innateness and 
objective forms integrates postmodernism into a site of 
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analysis with the cave allegory. Within this integration, a 
correlation between Plato and Derrida in an always already 






The nuances of always already take on more emphasis as 
this discussion underscores commonalities between Plato and 
Derrida within the Signified aspect of meaning. Julia 
Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language will serve to 
foreground the liminal spaces that Plato and postmodernists 
like Derrida might both occupy, since Kristeva's 
terminology bridges the concepts. Bridging appears critical 
because of Derrida's criticism against Platonic theory, 
especially for an understanding of always already in 
meaning-making. Using Kristeva's perspective on meaning­
making, we can more clearly consider how the concepts of 
ontological innateness and epistemological relativity might 
interact with always already. This interaction will include 
how Plato and Derrida's perspectives on those two concepts 
might enact a common representation that has not been 
considered previously.
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Always Already Connection through Kristeva
Connecting the Signified as a transcendental liminal 
aspect of meaning-making in language between Plato and 
Derrida requires consideration of the signifying aspect of 
language. In Revolution in Poetic Language, Julia Kristeva 
approaches language from a mainly psychological perspective 
and considers the liminal signification of language as a 
phenomenon of desire. Kristeva defines a transcendental ego 
through a Freud-Lacan amalgamation that essentially 
recognizes meaning-making through a psychoanalytical lens. 
This definition comprises a naming ("thetic") and 
predicating ("synthesizing") part, which posits logical 
acts among people enacting communication that "judges or 
speaks and, simultaneously, brackets all that is 
heterogeneous to its consciousness" (Kristeva 30,31-32).
Furthermore, Kristeva explains a "necessity of 
positing an ego as the single, unique constraint which is 
constitutive of all linguistic acts as well as all trans- 
linguistic practice" (32). For Kristeva, the transcendental 
aspect of the ego is always already present in meaning­
making, thereby denying a transcendental attribution to an 
external "linguistic universe" (32). Perception and 
experience, although logical acts, are not proofs of a 
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transcendental attribute of meaning-making because those 
two aspects of human living are empirically driven whereas 
the ego is internal.
Kristeva's perspective of the transcendental ego at 
first seems to contradict Plato's perspective of meaning­
making because external factors, which inspire a degree of 
meaning-making, temper the freed prisoner's journey to the 
sun. The freed prisoner's journey of learning is one of 
recognition of things always already in play with the 
transcendental ego. In addition, the freed prisoner's 
learning process always already concerns dialectic: first 
with the overseers, and last with an internalized 
dialectic. In all its stages, dialectic is language in the 
conversational occasion. In dialectic, an audience 
comprehends intended meaning-making only through language 
that uses named Signifiers capable of inspiring 
transcendental recognition of the Signifieds that the 
Signifiers represent. The transcendental ego of the freed 
prisoner constrains or tailors the dialectically-modeled 
language, and, accordingly, provides direction and focus 
during specific occasions.
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Simultaneously, the transcendental ego correlates to 
Derrida's decentering principle of meaning-making because 
Kristeva views:
... the subject in language as decentering the 
transcendental ego, cutting through it, and 
opening it up to a dialectic in which its 
syntactic and categorical understanding is merely 
a liminary movement of the process, which is 
itself always acted upon by the relation to the 
other dominated by the death drive and its 
productive reiteration of the '[S]ignifier.' (30)
Perhaps the transcendental ego can only enact meaning­
making in language through commonly recognizable 
signification. This enactment occurs by interaction with 
others (such as the freed prisoner and overseers) or by 
conversation with the self (as is the case when the freed 
prisoner ponders the sun and the surface world). The 
transcendental ego acts as the catalyst for the freed 
prisoner's agency in meaning-making with a correlation of 
Signified-endowed Signs.
The act of making meaning in language occurs through 
desire, as regulated by a transcendental ego. Plato 
reiterates the role of desire to his original audience,
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Glaucon, by stating the "going up and the seeing of what's 
above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, 
you'11 not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear 
it" (The Republic 7.517b). Here, Plato suggests Glaucon 
desires to be told how to gain wisdom and gain 
intelligibility.
Initially, the overseers engage in dialectic by their 
own freewill with the freed prisoner. The freed prisoner 
does not cooperate without coercion because the change is 
startling and difficult. The repetitious viewing of puppets 
and forms seen by the freed prisoner (and all others) 
insinuates the essential weakness when people attempt to 
make meaning through language. The weakness is the mind's 
finite nature. This nature requires repetition of Signs in 
order to always already combat forgetfulness.
The always already remembrance-forgetfulness cycle 
requires external Signs with transcendental Signifieds. 
This requirement exists in order to reconnect the meaning­
making process in language. As stated earlier, Kristeva's 
transcendental ego is the only internal measure that allows 
the freed prisoner to re-engage into this cycle of always 
already remembrance-forgetfulness. The ego limits the 
transcendental aspect. The inability of people to retain 
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absolute knowledge without error or forgetfulness also 
restricts the transcendental aspect.
Always Already Cycle and its Attending Discourse
This cycle is an instance, or Kristeva's "hyle," that 
always already deviates from closure because of the 
synthesizing nature of the transcendental ego wherein a 
moment is lost as soon as it is posited, but it is 
nonexistent without the positing (32). Kristeva's hyle 
corresponds to Plato's "chora" or "an essentially mobile 
and extremely provisional articulation constituted by 
movements and their ephemeral stases," which operates as a 
substitution-creating receptacle and not as a Sign itself 
(Kristeva 25). Kristeva extends her definition of Plato's 
chora as:
... not unified in an ordered whole because deity 
is absent from it. Though deprived of unity, 
identity, or deity, the chora is nevertheless 
subject to a regulating process ... which is 
different from that of symbolic law but 
nevertheless effectuates discontinuities by 
temporarily articulating them and then starting 
over, again and again" in an always already cycle 
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of remembrance and forgetfulness in attempt to 
make meaning in language. (26)
The temporary articulation of discontinuities is freeplay 
in motion. This freeplay needs Signs to recollect meaning­
making's connection.
Derrida explains this recollective freeplay through an 
interpretation of Plato's discussion of writing and memory 
in passage 7.533b from The Republic:
The space of writing, space as writing, is opened 
up in the violent movement of this
surrogation.... The outside is already within the 
work of memory.... A limitless memory would in 
any event be not memory but infinite self- 
presence. Memory always therefore already needs
[S]igns in order to recall the non-present, with 
which it is necessarily in relation.... But what 
Plato dreams of is a memory with no [S]ign.
(Dissemination 109)
Derrida suggests writing becomes "the doubling of a [S]ign, 
the [S]ign of a [S]ign" in order to vacillate between the 
overly simplistic alternative of presence/absence 
representation in language (Dissemination 109-110).
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Kristeva's hyle and Plato's chora compares to
Derrida's "differance," which is the "disappearance of any 
originary presence, is at once the condition of possibility 
and the condition of impossibility..." of Signified 
meaning-making in language (Dissemination 168). Derrida 
complicates the freeplay relationship between the line, 
Signifier and Signified. Those Sign aspects (line, 
Signifier and Signified) also represent presence/absence, 
or a relationship of difference. This relationship 
represents "a question of repetition" that is 
"systematically inseparable from that difference
<>
(Dissemination 111-112). The line between Signifier and 
Signified is always already at play with the two elements 
of the Sign. The line is the cyclic force.
Derrida explains that "writing estranges itself 
immensely from the truth of the thing itself 
[transcendental form], from the truth of speech, from the 
truth that is open to speech," whether composed as a 
printed copy or mentally because the meaning-making defers 
the whole of its intent (Dissemination 137). 
Simultaneously, this meaning-making differs its original 
intent during the writing/reading process.
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As his journey continues toward the surface world and 
the authentic forms present there, the freed prisoner 
begins to behave with desire to make meaning out of those 
Signs. The Signs initiate those thoughts because the hyle- 
chora-differance enacts displacement within the 
transcendental ego. Desire is the linking activity that 
causes the freed prisoner to construct a receptacle of 
substitutions through language. Desire also expresses the 
always already fading substitutions within the receptacle 
of mind and hardcopy. The substitutions are recollections 
of forms and other intelligible Signs that the writer 
renders.
Through Kristeva, the liminal space that Plato and 
postmodernists like Derrida might both occupy becomes 
clearer through an always already nuance. In shades of 
always already, "there exists only one signification ... 
which contains the object as well as the proposition, and 
the complicity between them" (Kristeva 44). Although this 
signification contains similarity in meaning-making, the 
texts themselves, as productions of language, remain 
imperceptible forever because they are interpretations of 
transcendental forms (Dissemination 63). The dialectical 
conversation that builds meaning is an intention of the
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forms and not the forms themselves. This occurs because a 
person's mind is incapable of divine perfection of memory. 
Dialectics intends on truth and nobility when communicating 
translatable meaning, and can only do so through referent 
Signs.
Kristeva's complicity between object and proposition 
concerns the function of writing as pointing to an 
essential aspect of the semiotic. She defines this semiotic 
aspect as "a modality of the signifying process with an eye 
to the subject posited (but posited as absent) by the 
symbolic" in which the drives that form the foundation of 
structural dichotomies in language are always already 
removed (Kristeva 41,43) . The removal occurs because the 
signifying process is a complication of judgments or 
positions orchestrated by the transcendental ego.
For Kristeva, the threshold of language represents the 
rupture point in which the freed prisoner creates meaning 
through language, thereby removing himself from reduction 
into the process of signification (44-45). The freed 
prisoner's breakthrough, or rupture, in language causing 
meaning to be in attendance (albeit temporarily) occurs 
through awareness of the linking line between Signifier and 
Signified. This awareness is an "opening up toward every 
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desire but also every act" that is an "always split 
unification that is produced by a rupture and is impossible 
without it" (Kristeva 47). As the rupture occurs in 
language, the cycle of meaning-making divides from itself 
before it is stable. Meaning shifts as it occurs during 
thought and visual writing but it seems to retain a trace 
element of meaning from its Signified form.
Kristeva's rupture correlates with Derrida's rupture, 
which occurs "when the structurality of structure had to 
begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated" (Writing and 
Difference 279). This correlation of rupture within 
meaning-making should not be surprising because Derrida 
credits Freud, whom Kristeva relies on considerably, for 
identifying the occurrence of a rupture "most closely to 
its most radical formulation" (280). Similar to Kristeva's 
perspective of meaning-making, Derrida's notion of meaning­
making through language is "not a fixed locus but a 
function ... in which an infinite number of Sign­
substitutions came into play" when enacted by the freed 
prisoner after temporarily recollecting the significance of 
the Signified forms (280) .
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The moment of rupture seems to be the instance of 
making meaning through language when its fluid nature is 
most evident, when:
... in the absence of a center or origin, 
everything became discourse ... [when] a system 
in which the central [S]ignified, the original or 
transcendental [S]ignified, is never absolutely 
present outside a system of differences. The 
absence of the transcendental [S]ignified extends 
the domain and the play of signification 
infinitely. (280)
The instability of the Signified ruptures creates 
opportunity for an expansion of meaning.
The freed prisoner acts out desire for a connection 
with the attending society. Hence, individualized (while 
pondering Signified forms) and socialized (while 
endeavoring to relate meaning through language with peers) 
learning occurs simultaneously. Like Saussure, Kristeva 
views the social realm as a symbolic structural device. In 
this apparatus, people confer with each other through a 
structure. This structure is "merely a play of images" that 
exists because individuals enact a degree of individual 
agency to "absorb 'the integrity of the [S]ignifier' that 
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is constituted once and for all, by finding corresponding 
[S]ignifieds," which is Plato's journey toward 
intelligibility and Signified forms (Kristeva 73, 76). 
Plato constitutes this social symbolism most clearly when 
the shackled prisoners debate meaning-making during the 
procession of shadowy images. The social unit seems to 
exist to retain structural relations with always already 
Signs.
During the procession of shadowy images, the 
individuals develop floating or "drifting [S]ignifiers" to 
continue the always already nature of meaning-making. 
Kristeva's drifting Signifiers correlate to Plato's 
dialectical depiction of meaning-making in the cave as well 
as Derrida's sense of freeplay that allows for a decentered 
and mobile meaning-making experience (Kristeva 74, 98). To 
make meaning through language, the individual attempts a 
temporary synthesis of the Signifier and Signified in order 
to play with this designation in society until agency 
becomes socialized enough to be "we" or "anonymous" 
(Kristeva 94-95). Different social systems rely on varied 
discourses or versions of Signs. Social systems, such as 
the shackled prisoner society and the overseer society, use 
variations of discourse particular to them because their 
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unique access to the Signified forms affects the social 
structures that support the Signs.
Inevitably, the freed prisoner, as individual, 
attempts to share meaning through language with the 
societies he encounters. His effort transitions from a 
singular "I" discourse of meaning to a "we" discourse that 
attempt to moderate meaning as well as socially- 
recognizable semiotic rules into a unified "attending 
discourse" (Dissemination 324-330). Illuminating the 
attending discourse accentuates the liminal space between 
Plato and Derrida. Through attending discourse, both Plato 
and Derrida acknowledge how the freed prisoner interprets 
previous knowledge with others. The individual uses 
freeplay within language to arrange the best sequence of 
named words (the most agreed upon drifting Signifiers). The 
best sequence can be defined as the exchange of language 
wherein the audience recognizes his series of Signified- 
laden words in the most appealing arrangement.
Perhaps the attending discourse is the phase in which 
meaning-making in language begins its cycle of re­
dislocation. This cycle partly initiates from an 
individual's original intention. An audience's unique 
perception of those Signified intentions follows. Language 
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always already changes in the process of exchanging this 
attending discourse.
Derrida's attending discourse conflicts with Plato's 
perspective on the transactional mediums used to make 
meaning. Plato denies that written texts can sustain 
independent meaning-making in intelligible language. 
Indeed, he views written texts as devices for those needing 
memory aides or desiring to read opinions (here, 
distinguished from intelligible information).
While Derrida might classify Plato's view of texts as 
simulacra, C. Jan Swearingen furthers this categorization 
of Platonic reasoning. Swearingen explains the act of 
writing as a singular operation of binding language outside 
its original expression and context (76). From Swearingen's 
perspective on composing, a writer disengages the original 
meaning and extracts all elements of context, which 
encompass "intention and understanding that shaped its 
original expression" (76). Through Swearingen's 
explanation, Plato's perspective on written language 
requires a voiceless text that cannot possess agency. This 
happens because the written simulacrum lacks a degree of 
dialectic that only oral language retains. As time moves 
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forward, the original intent and context of the writing 
separates from the articulated.
However, Plato seems to acknowledge that the meaning 
made in all forms of language fades in the always already 
continuum of time. Only the presence of Signified forms can 
recapture the intelligibility of those meanings, regardless 
of their original form (oral or written). Perhaps this is 
why Plato uses the cave allegory to depict an upward 
journey of the soul and not a destination with a finite 
endpoint. The journey resides somewhere in the paradox of 
always already, without endpoint or center.
Ontological Innateness and Epistemological 
Relativity
Linked to this Platonic perspective of the voiceless, 
unintelligible written text is consideration of Plato's 
purpose for the cave allegory: "a study to draw the soul 
from becoming to being" (The Republic 7.521d). Plato's 
allegorical study distinguishes between epistemology, or 
how a person comes to know, and ontology, or how objects 
and concepts come to be. This allegorical division is 
central to understanding his perception of the nature of 
meaning-making. Plato seems to suggest the ontological 
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nature of meaning-making in the act of writing is an 
overtly persuasive, somewhat forceful action because the 
study draws or urges the reader to progress.
The Platonic journey of meaning-making within the 
ontological structure occurs for the freed prisoner only as 
he can endure it, and not without loss and pain. For 
instance, the freed prisoner suffers when the overseers 
force him to progress beyond the sophistic meaning-making 
of those shackled. An overseer advances the freed 
prisoner's learning toward the surface world only after 
spending time learning from those around the fire and 
puppet show.
During this learning process, information previously 
thought valuable for someone attempting to make meaning 
becomes discarded or restructured. This occurs as the freed 
prisoner ponders the true/false nature of his learning. 
Restructuring of previous information becomes part of the 
cycle of always already attending discourse. This 
restructuring occurs in many formats such as subjugation 
and addition. Foundational information also shifts in 
placement. This shift becomes evident in writing as more 
sophisticated words and writing styles reveal a writer's 
learning progression. The freed prisoner builds 
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intelligible conclusions and inferences with new 
information, as Plato explains about the learning process:
... this power is in the soul of each, and that 
the instrument with which each learns ... must be 
turned around from that which is coming into 
being together with the whole soul until it is 
able to endure looking at that which is and the 
brightest part of that which is. (The Republic 
7.518c)
Perhaps the power within the soul is the ability to 
recognize and recapture Signified forms, or to be 
intelligible and not rely on opinions for meaning-making. 
The ability to infer might be the instrument with which 
each learns to use that intelligibility with self and 
society. The learning process seems incomplete until the 
freed prisoner can face the Signified forms that the 
overseers have referenced during their instruction.
The innateness of meaning-making is integral to the 
freed prisoner because desire for education causes him to 
seek out that which has been incomplete. Furthermore, 
innateness of meaning-making also applies to the Signified 
forms, which are always already both external and internal, 
present and absent. Writers mentally digest the Signified 
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forms as a result of the always already inference of them 
in language use in any society. Although, writers always 
already struggle with comprehending appropriate Signified 
forms because of the imperfect nature of incomplete Signs 
and sophistic persuasion in daily language use.
The shadowy images begin the journey of meaning-making 
in language because they are always already at play within 
the learning paradigm of Signified forms. The freed 
prisoner's presence and use of the Signified forms allow 
them to reappear and perpetuate. Otherwise, naming and 
meaning-making would become too inconsistent over time for 
societies and individuals to be able to infer or share 
knowledge.
Ontological innateness of Platonic meaning-making in 
language seems to be a symbiotic, cyclic relationship 
between student and form. Within this relationship of 
student and form, both always already enter and fade out of 
conditions of actualization of meaning-making. As the essay 
builds toward completion, the student as compositionist 
struggles within the always already continuum of placing 
the most applicable series of words in order to make 
meaning. This continuum is the writer's internal 
conversation at play, entering and fading out of a search 
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for the most appropriate Signified forms upon which to 
build the essay. Within this possibility, Derridian logic 
interacts with ontological innateness by opening the 
possibility of including epistemological relativity within 
the cave allegory.
Derrida asserts a site of collaboration between 
innateness and relativity. He insists "[o]ne cannot 
determine the center and exhaust totalization because the 
[S]ign which replaces the center, which supplements it, 
taking the center's place in its absence—this sign is 
added, occurs as a surplus, as a supplement" (Writing and 
Difference 289). The liminal space between innateness and 
relativity is possible because the freed prisoner's 
interactions within the learning paradigm are unique as he 
continues his journey. His interactions are unique because 
of a degree of agency he possesses. The dialectic nature of 
meaning-making inspires variations of old Signs as well as 
the construction of new Signs. Commonly recognized 
Signified forms serve as the foundation for intelligibility 
in this dialectic nature.
The individual's agency coexists with intelligibility 
and inference within a tension/suspension of Derridian 
freeplay wherein history and presence are in flux (Writing 
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and Difference 290-292). This playful tension on the 
journey of meaning-making produces unique utterances of 
language. These unique utterances make and alter meaning 
but sustain Signifieds because of tension that is always 
already loose but never wholly severed. The danger of not 
including Derridian logic as an integral part of my 
analysis would acknowledge dependency on Platonic 
Signifiers (the shadowy images and puppets) as mere 
milestones on a finite destination to Signified forms 
(Writing and Difference 290). Epistemological relativity 
exists inside the cave allegory because the freed 
prisoner's learning process is proportional to the unique 
ways in which he constructs meaning as an individual. The 
unique construction of compositions occurs with a degree of 
agency within the socialized realm of meaning-making.
Intelligibility is not a spontaneous and whole action 
within the freed prisoner. He must spend time deliberating 
with overseers and himself. The freed prisoner begins to 
conclude (and does not instantly conclude) and decides in a 
way how Signified forms interact, as with the sun and other 
Signified forms. Here, Plato insinuates that even at the 
closest point of ontological connection with the forms 
themselves, the freed prisoner can digest the knowledge 
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relative to how he can grapple with its complexity. His 
learning process does not replicate the ontological 
enlightenment exactly as those before him learned, although 
all seem to possess a common degree of remembrance because 
of the always already nature of Signified forms. His 
perceptual experience combines with an ability to make 
advanced inferences and unique utterances while making 
meaning in language.
This epistemological-ontological combination 
originates from Derrida's assertion that "[b]eing must be 
conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the 
possibility of play and not the other way around" (Writing 
and Difference 292). The play is within the freed 
prisoner's unique approach to the meanings that he contends 
with internally and externally. The uniqueness correlates 
to the nature of human experience, which plays at meaning­
making that appropriates social as well as personalized 
influences in order to build a composition. Kristeva 
explains this meaning-making phenomenon by claiming 
"Individuals ... confer upon each other, upon themselves, 
and upon those things they hold dear, the whole strength of 
society" to reveal a conglomeration of socially symbolic 
issues (76). Within that conglomeration, the tension of 
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freeplay interacts with inferences and decisions toward the 
words a writer finally composes in an essay. The things 
held dear are personal preferences or recognizable through 
Signs that will vary from person to person, thereby making 
meaning in various ways.
The freed prisoner purposes to absorb what he 
experiences on the meaning-making journey. Kristeva's 
"genotext" serves as language's underlying foundation to 
encompass the absorption process in which "the emergence of 
object and subject, and the constitution of nuclei of 
meaning involving categories: semantic and categorical 
fields" (86). Kristeva's meaning-involving emergence seems 
to correspond to Derrida's supplementary meaning-making 
nature when play in language causes rupture. Additionally, 
Kristeva's genotext serves to classify the innate process 
of the freed prisoner while attempting to build 
intelligibility from Signs. It is in the genotext that the 
freed prisoner functions increasingly with an ontological 
nature of meaning-making. Consequently, Signifieds become 
meaning in a more foundational ephemerally non-signifying 
manner.
The genotext seems to function as an internal 
dialectic within the freed prisoner. The internal dialectic 
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purposes to provide him with a "phenotext" that "obeys 
rules of communication and presupposes a subject of 
enunciation and an addressee" (Kristeva 87). The phenotext 
denotes the need for language use with what has recently 
become intelligible. The phenotext seems to operate on the 
understanding that the freed prisoner will desire to 
communicate with others. Desire operates within the freed 
prisoner to externalize the dialectically established 
meanings he resolves to extend to others, like a thesis- 
driven essay. This established meaning happens temporarily 
before forgetfulness begins the always already cycle of 
play in language. He must transcribe this meaning before it 
fades from memory. Besides communicating orally with 
others, the freed prisoner could transcribe his resolved 
meaning as a composition.
Throughout the intertwined onto-epistemological 
process of meaning-making, the freed prisoner engages in 
Kristeva's psychotic economies. Contemplation and text­
drafting practice are ways toward self-actualized psychotic 
economies. While contemplation and text-practice seem 
overtly internal, dialectic compels them socially. It is■ 
the social aspect that enables the always already cycle of 
remembrance with Signified forms.
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Especially in the phenotext phase, the freed prisoner 
considers how to relate Signifieds to others. Seen this 
way, discourse is a type of Signifier-endowed text that an 
audience must read correctly enough to comprehend the 
intended meaning. Both contemplation and text-practice work 
to provide the freed prisoner with the best means of 
authorship. Epistemological relativity seems to occur 
during the phenotext stage as the freed prisoner transforms 
the intelligible genotext into something communicable.
Conclusion
At the end of the cave allegory, the ability to 
communicate the phenotext requires the freed prisoner to 
contemplate how to relate what he learns to the shackled 
prisoners still at the bottom of the cave. He desires to 
communicate it in the best way relative to his ability to 
express meaning through language. Since he is always 
already in the cycle of meaning-in-flux, the freed prisoner 
is also readable as an incomplete text. The freed prisoner 
as an incomplete text consists of attempted but never 
completed meanings that struggle to assert themselves based 
on desire and occasion. It is the freed prisoner's 
incompleteness that inevitably negates the possibility of 
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an entirely ontologically-based meaning-making experience 
in language.
Kristeva provides a deeper entry point for considering 
the complications of a liminal space for postmodernism and 
Platonic theory to interact in composition studies. 
Kristeva's terminology serves to define as well as unite 
Derridian and Platonic motives in theory toward a common 
understanding of always already and the attending discourse 





To complete this discussion, I will focus this chapter 
on the implications of always already as a universal 
Signified (ideal form) for contemporary composition 
studies. The postmodern emphasis on the arbitrariness of 
meaning informs much contemporary composition theory and 
therefore could also inform a Platonic perspective within a 
liminal space. In this chapter, I seek to open a 
conversation that considers the possible significance of 
text construction through individual agency in conjunction 
with societal influences. This exploration will reassess 
the field's pedagogical approach to agency and essay 
creation through a postmodern critical lens.
Always Already Signified Forms for 
Contemporary Composition
Postmodernist compositionists propose that meaning­
making in writing results from writers enacting their role 
as overtly social beings. This view corresponds with David 
Bartholomae's perspective that knowledge is "situated in 
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the discourse that constitutes 'knowledge' in a particular 
discourse community, rather than as situated in mental 
'knowledge sites'" (599) . For these compositionists, texts 
represent a forcefully persuasive society that influences 
and even determines meaning in writing. As in the case of 
much postmodern thought, there is little room for 
individual resistance. Platonic and Derridian perspectives 
rely on a flexibility in meaning that might create avenues 
for acknowledging individual meaning-making within the 
social.
In an effort to substantiate postmodernism, 
postmodernists like Karen Burke LeFevre define the role of 
language and rhetorical invention as socially dependent and 
collaborative (117) . This social definition of composition 
relies more on what postmodernism is not rather than what 
it is. Postmodernists seem to define themselves in 
opposition to Platonic theory instead of classifying 
themselves through analysis that is independent of 
opposition. This method of defining postmodernism through 
an opposite appears to be an acknowledgement of the 
influence of Platonic theory in composition and the field 
of English studies over time.
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A necessary extension of analysis for always already 
meaning-making in language must articulate how 
postmodernism and Platonism interact. The core of this 
analysis projects through the postmodern lens of the cave 
allegory. Other Platonic works must be included in order to 
accentuate particular fixations in conjunction with 
postmodernism. For LeFevre, postmodern compositionists' 
opposition to Platonic theory relies on five key points, 
which hereafter will comprise the route of exploration.
Social Context
First, postmodernists assert Platonic invention in 
composition favors individualistic research and neglects 
analysis of writers in social contexts (LeFevre 23). As 
explained previously, Plato's cave allegory clearly 
includes social contexts for invention. The freed prisoner, 
who seeks greater understanding in order to further the 
journey of meaning-making, represents the model for 
Platonic composition throughout the allegory and not merely 
the end. The composition process appears even at the 
beginning of the allegory before the freed prisoner is 
free. The pre-freed prisoner is a template for the novice 
writer. This pre-freed prisoner begins to experiment with 
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the social influences of the shackled society, and how his 
own assertions interact to make meaning with the Signs that 
pass across the cave wall.
At the beginning of the allegory, the pre-freed 
prisoner engages in dialectic with the other shackled 
prisoners to make meaning out of the shadowy images seen on 
the cave wall. The invention process occurs through a join 
process of social and individual effort, much like a 
student builds an essay through peer reviews and personal 
effort. The social aspect of meaning-making transpires 
through dialectic with fellow prisoners. The individual 
characteristic involves the pre-freed prisoner attempting 
to invent judgments about the shadowy images to compete 
with the rest of the shackled society (The Republic 
7.516e). I suggest the freed prisoner's individual 
judgments can be thought of as thoughts. The reason for 
this classification is to depict the judgments in terms of 
how the individual is making meaning.
This thought process through judgment involves the 
development of mental Signs that represent individual 
judgments for single images seen on the cave wall. These 
Signs simultaneously represent previous socially- 
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constructed regurgitations as well as independently unique 
constructions, since memory is not perfect.
The presence of competition between those in the 
shackled society suggests degrees of difference between the 
pre-freed prisoner's judgments and what others attempt to 
claim. The play of difference in meaning-making between 
prisoners endorses a degree of individualism in the 
invention process toward a final socially acceptable name 
assigned to the shadowy images.
The shackled prisoners invoke creative judgments to 
express meanings they attempt to make with each other while 
shadowy images pass across the cave wall. Creative 
invention of names for the images becomes important in this 
instance, especially since the shackled prisoners generate 
assessments on shadowy Signs, which contain the least 
amount of empirical information. It is empirical creativity 
that most describes these novice meaning-makers. The 
invention expressed by these prisoners within this social 
unit always already changes. This occurs because the 
authors rely on competition and the absence of any recorded 
history, except Signs remembered from their fallible minds. 
It is thus that the beginning of Plato's allegory might 
represent a developing writer.
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Once unshackled, the freed prisoner interacts with the 
overseers to make sense of the images projected on the cave 
wall. As in the beginning of the allegory, the freed 
prisoner participates in a social context of meaning­
making. In this setting, the overseers rely on dialectic to 
educate the novice writer. The use of dialectic challenges 
the postmodern claim of a lack of social context in 
Platonic theory. Plato creates the cave allegory but this 
should not detract from its meaning for postmodernists as 
an allegory contextually linked to real society. The freed 
prisoner learns by answering questions. He concludes 
individually but with leading questions from the overseers- 
as-educators.
However, the overseers admit their puppets are not 
transcendental Signified forms. They clarify the puppets as 
Signifiers that help construct meaning because they are 
similar to Signified forms from the surface world. To 
further the freed prisoner's journey of education, the 
overseers help him glimpse the Signified forms out of the 
cave. The overseers fulfill their roles as dialectical 
educators that engage the individual in a social context.
When faced with Signified forms, the freed prisoner 
seems guilty by the postmodern view of anti-social 
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learning. Postmodernists assert a stage of meaning-making 
that denies collaboration and social interaction. It is 
here that ontology makes its unwelcome presence to 
postmodernists in the form of transcendental Signified 
forms. Yet, the social context of postmodernism's first 
defining point is at issue in relation to this part of the 
allegory as well as Plato's Phaedrus, which is commonly 
considered the central adversary to postmodern 
compositionists.
Postmodern critics such as Derrida (in Dissemination) 
and Neel (in Plato, Derrida, and Writing) rely on Plato's 
Phaedrus as the primary locus for his theories of writing. 
However, Phaedrus distinguishes between "good" and "bad" 
writing/speaking as it correlates to "good" and "bad" 
rhetoric, wherein every discourse must be organized or 
fitted in relation to each other as well as the whole 
(Phaedrus 156, 159). Through the character Socrates in 
Phaedrus, Plato praises writing speeches, which to me seem 
to include academic writing as well because this form of 
expression adheres to Plato's insistence that all effort be 
productive for the improvement of citizens.
Academic writing characterizes textual speech that 
carries''Signifieds within typed Signifiers on a page.
71
Derrida clarifies this characterization as deferring speech 
that generates desire for what now can be recognized as 
absent (Neel 117). Academic writing divides from other 
types of writing such as technical writing because it is 
written "in the narrow sense" to inscribe speech as a mere 
visual system of oral communication (Neel 112). Academic 
writing seems to be Derrida's "writing in the general" 
sense because it is the operation of difference and is 
absent of many things, including transcendental Signified 
forms (Neel 112). The distinction of academic writing 
indicates a visual system of Signs that replace 
transcendental Signifieds. The system of Signs always 
already.appears and vanishes for the compositionist and 
reader.
The simultaneous nature of Signs appearing and 
vanishing occurs because the compositionist and reader both 
desire the social connection of relation capable through 
Signified forms. It is a yearning for understanding between 
people. Furthermore, academic writing appears to be a type 
of dialectic that "always awaits the response of the other, 
a response that then requires a new speaking and then 
generates a new response and so on" (Neel 82). Essays 
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respond to prompts that always already become a response. 
In turn, essays invite readers to respond.
Rhetorically sound academic papers should contain 
Signified elements of truth within the Signs present in the 
typed text. These Platonic truths can only occur through 
social dialectic. This dialectic becomes writing 
exemplified as the absence of truth by revealing truth as 
the one thing beyond closure (Neel 82).
Plato might be said to acknowledge differance in the 
"noble" version of rhetoric's possibility, although never 
witnessed by readers (Gorgias 122). The differance within 
noble rhetoric corresponds to Derrida's sense of writing in 
the general sense because Signs always already replace the 
elusive transcendental Signified forms (Neel 112). The 
social context during the writing and reading of an essay 
temporarily fuses Signifiers with Signifieds into Signs. 
These fusions are recognizable enough for a writer to 
attempt a bridge of meaning-making relation with a reader.
These attempts remain always already inadequate 
because of the finite space on the page to represent 
precise meaning. The inadequacy exists because of the 
finite ability of the writer to express whole Signs. Texts 
especially by novice writers become a kind of textual 
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puppet, with sentences that proceed across the pages like 
shadowy images of their original intention. Phaedrus 
mirrors the assertion of socially imbued meaning-making, as 
in the cave allegory, because an awareness of relation 
between texts naturally leads to recognition of relation 
between audiences. Audiences are social recipients of the 
texts.
The Open System
LeFevre's second defining point for postmodernism 
accuses Platonic theory of depicting invention as a 
"closed, one-way system" (24). As previously discussed, 
social relation using Platonic theory becomes a textual 
bridge that recognizes and distinguishes between external 
relations. The ability to recognize and distinguish 
requires knowledge of a body of influences that inevitably 
shape a textual draft.
The freed prisoner engages with many influences. Some 
are external: shadowy images and voices of other prisoners, 
puppets and overseers, as well as Signified forms. Others 
are internal: his thoughts interacting with previous 
judgments. The body of influences is always already at play 
in the invention process of the writer.
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The cave allegory also denies LeFevre's interpretation 
of Platonic one-way meaning-making. The freed prisoner 
continually reevaluates what he learns. The freed prisoner 
transforms knowledge into language to express to others. 
The freed prisoner's invention process, in an always 
already cycle of restructuring itself in a decentered 
learning process, calls into question the nature of the 
writer with society. The freed prisoner also represents 
decenteredness. When he learns something new, it causes 
pain at first and repetitive periods of acclimation as he 
readdresses the Sign-filled world around him. The 
readdressals are outward representations of decenteredness 
in the freed prisoner.
After learning more about the puppet Signifiers that 
the overseers parade before firelight, an overseer leads 
the freed prisoner upward to the surface world. There, the 
freed prisoner gazes at his first Signified form. It is 
light from a sun but not the sun itself because the 
learning process requires acclimation from the shocking 
pain of brightness.
Initially, the freed prisoner engages in dialectic to 
discuss this form with the overseer in order to more 
accurately validate nuances of truths and lies. Here, the 
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distinction is more about degrees and less about absolutes 
since previous knowledge from shadowy Signs would cause him 
to be "at a loss and believe that what was seen before is 
truer than what is now shown" (The Republic 7.515d). 
Meaning transfers externally as language, between people in 
the face of Signified forms.
At this point, postmodernists like Neel prefer the 
less-than-absolute nature that seems to exist in this 
exchange. Postmodernists such as Derrida and Neel prefer a 
focus on Signifier/freeplay instead of a Signified/absolute 
relationship (Neel 103). The freed prisoner as writer is in 
a decentered state while making meaning through language 
with the overseer about the Signified forms.
During this dialectical learning about the Signified 
forms, the freed prisoner's meaning-making transitions into 
an internal state that does not enlist the help of external 
sources such as an overseer (The Republic 7.516a-b). It is 
here that postmodernists have the greatest challenge 
accepting Platonic theory for composition. Here, the freed 
prisoner rewrites the meaning-making paradigm by solitary 
contemplation of the Signified forms. Although he does not 
engage in vocal conversation with others, the freed 
prisoner considers the ontological state of Signified 
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forms. This consideration happens from a foundation of 
knowledge that originates out of social construction 
(overseers and shackled prisoners) as well as his uniquely 
creative contemplations.
He builds upon, corrects and makes new meaning based 
on recognition of innate knowledge that signifies the 
Signified forms. He infers and extrapolates from an 
internal conversation. This internal conversation 
recognizes innateness through commonly understood Signs 
learned over the course of his journey of learning. The 
commonly understood Signs refer to Signifieds he now 
witnesses.
Loss of Abstraction and Exclusion
At the most intimate point of recognition of Signified 
forms, the freed prisoner is his most internal self. The 
freed prisoner in this state seems to be a kind of 
abstraction from society, which is LeFevre's third point of 
postmodern judgment against Platonic theory (25). At a 
certain point, the freed prisoner relies on Signified forms 
and his internal self to sort out all he has digested over 
time to make meaning. It is a cataloguing of the mind.
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The mental cataloguing becomes subverted once again in 
the same instant that it happens as a Derridian rupture 
occurs in the learning cycle. The freed prisoner engages in 
an internalized social dialogue with himself while 
considering his next decision. Should he return to his 
former station and interact with the shackled prisoners 
using the knowledge he has gained? Or should he stay on the 
surface world and interact with the others he sees living 
there?
Either way, the freed prisoner faces an audience for 
the language he always already constructs mentally. If a 
person interrupts his decision making process, the freed 
prisoner would likely state, "Quiet. I can't hear myself 
think while you're speaking." Here again is the differance 
of dialectic in meaning-making because one voice (external) 
must temporarily be silent while another voice (internal) 
speaks. The internal speaking voice is one of remembrance. 
It is one of innateness that is always already in a cycle 
of needing Signs and forms as catalysts to recall itself to 
the finite mind of the compositionist.
To return to the cave is the noblest yet deadliest 
option the freed prisoner can choose. Choice is an act of 
agency as an individual without the coercion of social 
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forces like the overseers, who previously forced him 
forward on his journey of learning. The freed prisoner 
acquires enough knowledge to begin relying less on social 
constraints. He relies more on himself yet not wholly out 
of a social context when determining how to make meaning 
for himself as a more advanced compositionist.
Like Socrates, who chose as an individual not to flee 
from a society that charged him with a crime of teaching 
controversial meaning-making, the freed prisoner must 
decide how to react with a similar society of elitists. 
Albeit shackled, those elitist prisoners, whose shackles 
perhaps represent their own errant freeplay, would refuse 
to believe the freed prisoner. They would likely attempt to 
murder him before he completes a displacement of their 
meaning-making monopolies in the cave world (The Republic 
7.517a). If the freed prisoner chooses to return to the 
bottom of the cave, then he becomes the polar opposite of 
an abstraction with the society of shackled prisoners. He 
becomes a very concrete threat in the Platonic sense of a 
writer facing an audience that becomes hostile because of 
the message of his language.
Postmodernists might assert that the freed prisoner- 
as-writer becomes an abstraction because the meaning he 
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makes is too foreign to the social audience of shackled 
prisoners. If this is the postmodern view, then it is 
likely a misconstrued conclusion of one of two issues: 
either the audience obstinately refuses to listen because 
those in power do not pre-approve his language speaking 
rights, or the freed prisoner-as-writer fails to use 
rhetorical methods that appeal to that particular audience.
For Plato, noble rhetoric proposes to expose injustice 
in order to help people become better citizens. Noble 
rhetoric persistently states what is best, regardless if 
the audience considers it pleasant to hear (Gorgias 122- 
123). Nobility of purpose toward an audience, regardless of 
the consequences, represents a summary of the first half of 
Plato's Phaedrus, which details the divine madness of the 
lover to the beloved, or the writer to the audience (148). 
Divine madness contains a desire to relate meaning through 
language. This desire seeks to accomplish the relation of 
text to a reader in order to share the remembrance of 
Signified forms and extend the bridges of reasoning in 
general.
To share a remembrance of Signified forms can be an 
act of writing and reading an essay. During this process, 
recognition of those Signified forms represents a kind of 
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remembrance that seats emotion in a kindred spirit. It 
seems the writer shares this kindred spirit when attempting 
to write with an audience in mind, as if reaching out with 
a degree of love for the intended message but also the 
intended audience. As Plato states, to be in love is like 
remembering heaven (Phaedrus 151). Writing for an audience- 
regardless of the audience's approachability—is to have the 
best intentions for that audience. Best intentions 
encompass a desire to share the remembrance of essential 
meaning through a text. To consider what is best for an 
audience, regardless of the democratically mob-like state 
of a society, is to internalize an engagement of meaning­
making with that society.
The freed prisoner's actions cannot be an abstract. 
His concern for the society of shackled prisoners is a 
central aspect of how he desires to relate language to the 
shackled prisoners. Although Plato considers this noble 
form of rhetoric possible, he has never witnessed it 
(Gorgias 123). Plato reveals the always already elusive 
nature of rhetoric at play with the author. The nature of 
Platonic rhetorical invention endeavors to engage with the 
social. However, Plato cautions this endeavor is likely to 
fail before the intended meaning is made.
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The real world implication is that the freed prisoner, 
acting as an advanced writer and having witnessed the 
Signified forms, likely would become abstracted prior to 
the audience receiving it as intended. This spontaneous 
abstraction would occur because the nobility of the 
rhetoric in the freed prisoner's text always already fades 
before the readers comprehend the whole of his original 
meaning.
Atomistic Self-Refutation
In the fourth postmodern point against Platonic 
theory, the inventor of texts is an atomistic self (LeFevre 
26). An atomistic self as the smallest unit insinuates the 
writer is not a social artifact but undivided by social 
influences. The combination of inventor with atomistic 
reinforces the postmodern view of the writer as sole 
inventor of a text, which this thesis seeks to complicate. 
Classifying a Platonic writer as atomistic misleads 
composition studies.
Regardless of the experience level, a writer always 
already engages in a complex series of decisions about the 
occasioned language to use. This engagement transpires in 
order to bridge writer, text, and audience. The triangular 
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perspective on writing lends a description that is neither 
solely isolated nor social.
As postmodernists theorize how meaning occurs in 
language, they seem to want all or nothing when considering 
always already and the nature of agency in the writer. The 
analysis here presents Platonic theory in conjunction with 
Derrida as flexible within an always already fluctuating 
language system of Signs. Although imperfectly, these Signs 
allow people to forever glimpse Signified forms. This brief 
look opens an opportunity for recollection of a 
transcendental thread that bridges Signifiers and Signified 
forms within meaning-making over time and across social 
groups.
Collaboration
The fifth and last of LeFevre's postmodern criticisms 
defines Platonic theory as denying collaboration with 
invention (29). As previously discussed, the freed prisoner 
engages with collaboration internally and externally 
throughout the journey of learning. The internal voice is a 
speaking voice that engages in collaboration with a 
decision-making self.
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Externally, the overseers help the freed prisoner 
develop stronger connections and strategies for writing 
through dialectic. Dialectic is a form of collaboration 
with an emphasis on teacher-student relation. The relation 
opens a liminal space for broadening understanding with 
text creation and revision.
Prior to leading the freed prisoner out into the sun 
where the genuine Signified forms are present, the 
overseers engage in a collaborative dialectic with the 
freed prisoner by using the only common element available: 
puppets that remind him of shadowy images. Teaching through 
commonalities represents scaffolding between the known and 
the unknown. The puppets become the common element for 
discussing how former knowledge transforms into various 
complications. They exchange words common to his 
understanding in order to help the learning journey. This 
understanding requires a degree of selected invention, as 
in a writing process; the overseers are careful with the 
invention of their dialectic in order to create a 
conversation that the freed prisoner can have the best 
opportunity to grasp. Otherwise, the freed prisoner would 
be incapable of learning because their dialectic would be 
similar to a foreign language.
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Conclusion
This shared space of communication represents a visual 
language that is liminally applicable for postmodernism as 
well as Platonism in composition studies. Among other 
things, collaborative dialectic is "an innovative and 
powerful instructional device" for professors and students 
(Golden 36). Dialectic cannot occur without mutual 
understanding of Signs through language. This mutual 
understanding is recollection of transcendentals that 
bridge meanings made over time and across social groups.
The always already instability allows both writer and 
reader to coexist in a Platonic construct wherein meaning 
makes itself apparent through individual as well as social 
means to bridge language over time. Application of this 
dialectic in composition allows for professors to enhance 
their explanations of how meaning is made to students in 
order to provide a framework for postmodernists as well as 
those who do not ascribe to postmodernism.
Regardless of a person's perspective on postmodernism, 
the realization of meaning-making in an always already 
framework enables students to recognize the importance of 
perspective and diversity. Recognition of Signified-laden 
texts as always already in a state of bridging meaning­
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making will enable professors and students to consider how 
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